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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA\\
OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE

S

By

OSMOND

K.

FRAENKEL*

years ago, before the rapid development of the subject
under prohibition, I wrote an article which attempted to sum-

OME

manze the history of the fourth amendment and the then state

of the law concerning searches and seizures.'

Others have since

discussed various aspects of the situation2 and Mr Cornelius has
*Of the Bar of New York City.
'Concermng
Searches and Seizures, (1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361.
2
Atkmson, Admissibility of Evidence obtained through unreasonable
searches and seizures, (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 11. Atkinson, Prohibition
and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case, (1925) 23 Mich. L. Rev. 748 and 59
Am. L. Rev. 728. Baker, Searches and Seizures under the National Prohibition Act, (1928) 16 Geo. L. J. 415. Carpenter, Admissibility of Evidence illegally obtained, (1925) 4 Or. L Rev. 160. Carroll, Search and
Seizure Provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions, (1923) 10 Va. L.
Rev. 124. Chaffee, Progress of the Law, 1919-1927, Evidence: Searches
and Seizures, (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 694. Elledge, Evidence Illegally Obtamed, Inadmissible in Criminal Trial, (1927) 5 Tex. L. Rev. 424. Ely,
Federal Constitutional Limitations on Searches by State Authority, (1927),
12 St. L. L. Rev. 159. Ely, Probable Cause, (1928) 13 St. L. L. Rev. 101.
Freund, Search and Seizure, (1924) 56 Chic. Leg. N. 211. Gault. Requirements as to Search Warrants and the Use of Evidence obtained with and
without Warrant, (1926) 4 Mich. S. B. J. 163. Harno, Evidence obtained
by Illegal Search and Seizure, (1925) 19 Ill. L. Rev. 303. Lecliner, Right
of Search under the Federal Constitution, (1923) 6 Bi-Mo. L. Rev. 2-".
McKee, Admissibility of Evidence illegally obtained, (1923) 20 Ohio L.
B. 593. Meuth, Admissibility of Evidence obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure, (1923) 11 Ky. L J. 223. Nelson, Search and Seizure, (1923) 9
A. B. A. J. 773. Patterson, Case for admitting in evidence liquor illegally
seized, (1924) 3 Ore. L. Rev. 334. Powell, Supreme Court's construction
of the Federal Const. in 1920-21, (1922) 20 Mich. L. Rev. 381. 390. Rosebraugh, Case for the exclusion of evidence obtained by illegal search,
(1924) 3 Or. L. Rev. 323. Skipworth, Law of Search and Seizure, (1924)
3 Ore. L. Rev. 179. Statler, Searches and Seizures, (1922) Wash. S. B. A.
125. Thormodsgard, The Agnello case and the Seasonable Demand Rule.
(1927) 1 Dak. L. Rev. 3. Trueman, Right of Search and Seizure as ap-
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compiled an extensive book on the subject.' There have, however,
been recent developments which justify further discussion.
(a)

THE USE OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

The sharp difference of opinion among the various states on
the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search has been
generally noted. Professor Wigmore has been a persistent opponent of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court.' At the
time of my earlier article (1920) this federal rule had received
the support of only one state-Michigan.' It had, however not
been explicitly rejected, the almost complete opposition being based
on the old rule that no collateral inquiry would be made at trial
as to the manner in which evidence had been obtained." Iowal
and Vermont' had. however, permitted such inquiry and anticipated the result, if not the practice, of the Weeks Case'
In the intervening years the question has been reconsidered
in almost every state. New Hampshire,10 New Mexico" and
Vermont1 2- alone have had no new cases.
plied to Person and Vehicle, (1927)

2 Ala. L. J. 233.

White, Admissi-

bility of Evidence illegally obtained, (1923) 20 Ohio L. B. 623. Wigmorc,
Using Evidence obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, (1922) 8 A. B. A. J.
479. Wood, Scope of Constitutional Immunity against Searches and Seizures, (1927) 34 W Va. L. Q. 1, and (1928) 34 W Va. L. Q. 137 Wood-

son, Search of Automobile on Information without Warrant, (1927) 6 Or.
L. Rev. 177 See also notes in 24 A. L. R. 1408 32 A. L. R. 408 40 A. 1_. R.
1145 and 52 A. L. R. 477
aCornelius, The Law of Search and Seizure.
4Wigmore, Evidence, Ist ed. sec. 2264 pp. 3125-7 8 Am. B. A. J. 479
4 Wigmore, Evidence 2d ed., sees. 2183, 2184, pp. 626-639; sec. 2264, pp. 86771 but
see contra 4 Jones Evidence, 2d ed., pp. 3864-80.
5
People v. Marxhausen, (1919) 204 Mich. 559, 574, 171 N. W 557
See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 371, note 59.
6
7 See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 368, notes 41, 45.
State v. Sheridan, (1903) 121 Ia. 164, 96 N. W 730.
8State v. Salmon, (1901) 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097 (but see Statc v.
Krinski, (1905) 78 Vt. 162, 62 Atl. 37 refusing to extend the rule to contraband)
9Weeks
v. United States. (1914) 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341. 58
L. Ed. 652. 34 Harv. L. Rev. 372.
0
1 State v. Agalos, (1919) 79 N. H. 241, 107 Atli. 314, (rcaffirming the
old rule of State v. Flynn, (1858) 36 N. H. 64)
"State v. Barela, (1917) 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545. (This was a
"shoe" case merely holding that there was no illegal search.)
The (Ilicstion has been considered at length in an unreported case now pending on
rehearing. This is State v. Hammond, originally decided in 1924, which
reviews the authorities and holds the evidence admissible upon the grouind
that it was not the intention of the constitutional guarantee to limit the
use of evidence, and also because the use of evidence in such cases does

not result in injury to the innocent. It is interesting to note that the case

was a civil proceeding arising out of supplementary proceedings, but the
evidence apparently was sought for use in projected criminal proceedings.
'2See note 8 supra.
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Fifteen courts of last resort of the remaining forty-five have
adopted the federal rule and twenty have rejected it, although in
only fourteen was the discussion necessary to the decision. Upholding it are. Florida, 13 Idaho, 4 Illinois," Indiana,"0 Kentucky,"7
Michigan,' 5 Mississippi, 19 Missouri, 2 Montana, 2 1 Oklahoma,:!
"
and
Tennessee,2 3 Washington, 24 West Virginia, 2 5 Wisconsin,
29
2
27
California,"
In opposition Alabama, s Arkansas,
Wyonng.
"31Hart v. State, (1925) 89 Fla. 202, 103 So. 633. See also I Fla. Laws 1927
ch. 12257 cited and discussed-footnote 108.
14 State v. Arregui, (1927) 44 Id. 43, 254 Pac. 788 (one judge dissenting without opinion).
15People v. Castree, (1924) 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. "112. (one judge dissenting).
193 Ind. 585, 141 N. E. 353. See also Wallace
16Flum v. State, (1923)
v. State, (1927) 199 Bid. 317, 157 N. E. 657 (two judges dissented on the
ground that the warrant was sufficient). (See State v. Shumaker, (Ind.
1927) 157 N. E. 769, upholding a contempt charge against attorneys of The
Anti-Saloon League for criticisms of the decisions of the Indiana courts and
election threats against its members).
17Youman v. Commonwealth, (1920) 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W 860. See
also Gilliland v. Commonwealth, (1928) 224 Ky. 453, 6 S. W (2d) 467
'sPeople v. Marxhausen, (1919) 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W 557, People
v. Bass, (1926) 235 Mich. 588, 209 N. W 927, (the evidence was received,
three judges dissenting because no motion had been made-See 11 Mi. .soTA LAW REVIEW. 179.
"9Owens v. State, (1923) 133 Miss. 752, 98 So. 233, (two judges dissenting). See also Chrestman v. State, (1927) 148 Miss. 673, 114 So. 748.
20
State v. Owens, (1923) 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W 100, (two judges dissenting).
21State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, (1921) 59 Mont. 600, 198 Pac.
362. (See State v. Gardner, (1926) 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 permitting
use of2 evidence where seizure was by federal officers).
2 Hess v. State, (1921) 84 Okla. 73, 202 Pac. 310.
23
Hughes v. State, (1921) 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. V 588. See also State
(1925) 153 Tenn. 162, 281 S. W 936.
v. Bass,
4
2 State v. Gibbons, (1922) 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390. See also State
v. Buckley, (1927) 145 Wash. 87 258 Pac. 1030.
25State v. Wills, (1922) 91 W Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261. See also State
v. Koil, (1927) 103 W Va. 19, 136 S. E. 510.
-GHoyer v. State, (1923) 180 Wis. 407 193 N. W 89.
-7 State v. Peterson, (1920) 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342. See also State
v. George, (1924) 32 Wyo. 223, 231 Pac. 683.
28 Banks v. State, (1921) 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293. See also McCormick
v. State, (Ala. 1927) 112 So. 809.
29
Benson v. State, (1921) 149 Ark. 633, 233 S. V 758. (The federal
rule was not discussed). Von Hook v. Helena, (1926) 170 Ark. 1083, 282
S. W 673. (Although a motion was made before trial the Benson Case
was held controlling. The search was held lawful and the general question
was not decided. Two judges dissented without opinion). Knight v. State,
(1926) 171 Ark. 882, 286 S. W 1013. (The search was held lawful. Two
judges dissented in an exhaustive opinion upholding the federal rule).
Milton v. City of Fort Smith, (1927) 175 Ark. 694, 1 S. W (2d) 45. (The
earlier cases were held controlling- three judges dissented without opinion).
3oPeople v. Mayen, (1922) 188 Cal. 237 205 Pac. 435.
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3
Colorado, 3 Connecticut,3" Delaware,"3 Iowa, 4 Kansas," Louis0
s
3
7
Nevada,40 New
Nebraska,
Massachusetts,
iana,3 6 Maryland,
44
43
42
41
York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,"'
Utah,46 and Virginia.17 Five states have refused to apply the federal rule to contraband, leaving the general question open Min-

3"Massantomo v. People, (1925) 77 Col. 392, 236 Pac. 1019.
32State v. Magnano, (1922)
97 Conn. 543, 117 Atd. 550. (The search
was held lawful, but the practice of moving before trial was condemned)
See also State v. Reynolds, (1924) 101 Conn. 224, 125 Ati. 636. (The
search was also held lawful but the federal rule was discussed and rejected).
33State v. Chucola, (1922) 32 Del. 133, 120 At. 212. (The decision is
only that contraband can be used in evidence, but the federal rule is criticized,4 one judge dissented).
3 State v. Tonn, (1923) 195 Iowa 94, 191 N. W 530. (This overruled earlier Iowa cases, see note 7 and the recent case of State v. Rowley
(1923) 187 N. W 7 which on rehearing was reversed (1924) 197 Iowa 977
195 N. W 881. Two judges dissented).
35State v. Johnson, (1924) 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245. (In this case
there was no claim bv defendant to ownership of what had been seized,
See also State v. Kelly, (1928) 125 Kan. 807
one judge dissented)
265 Pac.
1109.
6
3 State v. Eddins, (1926) 161 La. 240, 108 So. 468. (Three judges dissented without opinion).
37Meisinger v. State, (Md. 1928) 141 Atl. 536. (Three judges dissented, (Md. 1928) 142 Atl. 190).
"sCommonwealth v. Wilkins, (1923) 243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. 11.
(There
was only meagre discussion of the federal rule)
390Billings v. State, (1923) 109 Nebr. 596, 191 N. W 721.
4 State v. Chin Gin, (1924) 47 Nev. 431, 224 Pac. 798.
41People v. Defore, (1926) 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585, certiorari de
med,42(1926) 270 U. S. 657 46 Sup. Ct. 355, 70 L. Ed. 784.
State v. Pauley (1922) 49 N. D. 488, 192 N. W 91. (The search was
held lawful two judges dissented). See also State v. Fahn, (1925) 53
N. D.43 203, 205 N. W 67
Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, (1927) 290 Pa. St. 174, 138 Atd. 679.
(The court considered only the question of self-incrimination and permitted the use of evidence which might have been seized under a warrant one judge dissented without opinion)
44State v. Green, (1922) 121 S. C. 230, 114 S. E. 317 (The search
was held lawful, and the Weeks Case distinguished on ground that timely
motion was made in that case). State v. Kanellos, (1923) 124 S. C. 514,
117 S. E. 640. (The search was held lawful, four judges dissented).
State v. Prescott, (1923) 125 S. C. 22, 117 S. E. 637 (The Green Case
was held controlling- five judges dissented on the ground that the federal
rule should apply). State v. Maes, (1923) 127 S. C. 397, 120 S. E. 576.
(The search was held lawful, but the federal rule was discussed and
rejected). State v. Griffin, (1924) 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81. (The search
State v. Brown, (1924) 129 S. C. 286, 124 S. E. 87
was held lawful)
(The practice of preliminary motion was condemned). State v. Gault,
(1926) 138 S. C. 459, 136 S. E. 739. (The search was held lawful and the
Prescott Case was reviewed and approved).
4
5Welchek v. State, (1923) 93 Tex. Cr. 271, 247 S. W 524.
4
GState v. Aime, (1923) 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704.
*7Lucchesi v. Commonwealth, (1922) 122 Va. 872, 94 S. E. 925. (The
search was held lawful). See also Hall v. Commonwealth, (1924) 138
Va. 727 121 S. E. 154. (In a later case of Hall v. Commonwealth, (1925)
143 Va. 554, 130 S. E. 416 the search was held lawful; one judge dissented
in favor of the federal rule).
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nesota,

4s

North Carolina,

49

0

Ohio,"

Rhode Island,"

and South

52

But most of these are decisions that the search was
Dakota.
5
have not really
lawful. Georgia, 53 Maine, 4 and New Jersey
old rule against
the
reviewed the federal rule but have reaffirmed
"
and
collateral inquiry. The question remains open in krizona

Oregon."7
-8State v. Hesse, (1923) 154 Minn. 89, 191 N. W 267 (The search
was held lawful and the court expressly refrained from deciding whether
the federal rule should be followed and earlier decisions overruled, such
as State v. Stoffels, (1903) 89 Minn. 205, 94 N. W 675, which rested on
the common law objection to collateral inquiry). State v. Pluth, (1923)
157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W 789. (The search was held unlawful, but the
federal rule interpreted as not forbidding the use of evidence wich would
not be returned because contraband. Where no contraband was involved
was left undecided).
the question
49 State v. Simmons, (1922) 183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E. 591. (The search
was held .lawful and the general question not discussed). See also State
v. Godette, (1924) 188 N. C. 497, 125 S. E. 24.
5ORosansks v. State, (1922) 106 Ouo St. 442, 140 N. E. 370. (The
search was held lawful, the court intimated that the result would have
been different had the liquor been lawfully owned). See also State v.
Sabo, (1923) 108 01o St. 200, 140 N. E. 499 (Search also held lawful).
51State v. Chester, (1925) 46 R. I. 485, 129 Ad. 596. (The search was
held 5 lawful).
2
City of Sioux Falls v. Walser, (1922) 45 S. D. 417 187 N. W 821.
(The search was held lawful). See also State v. Newhart, (1926) 50
S. D. 272, 209 N. W 542. (There was no preliminary motion).
53Calhoun v. State, (1916) 144 Ga. 679, 87 S. E. 893. (The federal
rule was not referred to). Johnson v. State, (1921) 152 Ga. 271, 109 S. E.
662. (The federal rule was not reviewed, as the cases were held not bindmg on state courts). Kennemer v. State, (1922) 154 Ga. 139, 113 S. F.
551. (The Calhoun Case was held controlling).
54
State v. Choroszy, (1923) 122 Me. 283, 119 At. 662. (Tis case was
decided without discussion on State v. Schoppe, (1915) 113 Me. 10, 92
At1. 867, which without discussion rested on State v. McCann, (1873) 61
Me. 116).
s5 State v. King, (1926) 4 N. J. Misc. 218, 132 At. 312.
State v. Merra, (1927) 103 N. J. L. 361, 137 Ati. 575.
(These
State v. Gillette, (1927) 103 N. J. L. 523, 138 At. 381.
cases rest on State v. Lyons, (1923) 99 N. J. L. 301, 122 Ad. 758
and State v. McQueen, (1903) 69 N. J. L. 522, 55 Ad. 1006, in which
no motions before trial were made and the exceptions at the trial
The federal rule is not discussed in any of
were badly taken.
these cases but was rejected by an inferior court, State v. Black,
(1926) 5 N. J. Misc. 48, 132 Atl. 685).
5
6Argetakis v. State, (1923) 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372.
57
State v. McDaniel, (1925) 115 Or. 187 234, 237 Pac. 373. (The
search was held lawful on rehearsing, three judges dissenting. Originally, (1925) (115 Or. 187 208, 231 Pac. 965) the search was held illegal
and the Federal rule applied, three judges dissenting, on the authority
of a dictum m State v. Laundy, (1921) 103 Or. 443, 495, 204 Pac. 958,
975). See 3 Or. L. Rev. 323, 334 4 Or. L. Rev. 160- 5 Or. L. Rev. 162).
State v. Harris, (1926) 119 Or. 422, 299 Pac. 1046. (The search was
held unlawful, but as no preliminary motion had been made the court
refused to consider the question). See State v. Hilton, (1926) 119 Or.
441, 249 Pac. 1103, State v. DeFord, (1926) 120 Or. 444, 250 Pac. 220State v. Lee, (1927) 120 Or. 643, 253 Pac. 533 and State v. Muetzel,
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In two states the legislatures have differed from the courts.
In Texas the federal rule has been adopted and extended to its
fullest possible scope. 58 In Mississippi a law permitting testimony
in liquor cases despite illegal search was held unconstitutional by
a divided court.59
There can, therefore, be counted in support of the federal
rule eighteen states,60 in opposition nineteen, 1 non-committal six,"
the remaining five not having reviewed the new rule but having
approved the old.13 It can no longer be said that there is weight
of authority against the federal rule, especially in view of the fact
that in many of the cases opposing the rule the question was not
necessary to the decision and often the result depended on one
judge's vote.
Perhaps the most satisfactory statement of the opposition to
the federal rule is to be found in People v. Defore.14 In this case
a blackjack was found on a search made incident to an illegal
arrest. This is the first discussion of the subject by the New York
court of appeals. People v Adams, 5 had rested on the common
(1927) 121 Or. 561, 254 Pac. 1010. (In all these cases the searches were
held 58lawful and the general question therefore not discussed).
Texas, Laws 1925, 49, amending Title 8, chap. 7 Texas, C. C. P
1911, by adding article 787a "No evidence obtained by an officer or other
person in violation of any provision of the constitution or laws of the
state of Texas, or of the United States of America, shall be admitted In
evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." See
Sherow
v. State, (1927) 105 Tex. Cr. 650, 290 S. W 754.
59
Orick v. State, (1925) 140 Miss. 184, 105 So. 465. (Two judges
dissented).
60Ohio (dictum, see note 50 supra) , Texas (statute, see note 58
supra) and Vermont (old case, see note 12) in addition to the states
listed in notes 13 to 27 supra. It may be that Oregon might be added to
the list. See note 57 supra. (Sixteen states are listed in 52 A. L. R.
477 478-Ohio, Vermont and Washington not being included while
Oregon is)
60Excluding Texas (see note 58 supra) from the states listed in notes
28 to 47 supra. (Twenty-eight states are listed in 52 A. L. R. 477 478by including those allowing the use of contraband evidence, except
Rhode Island and those following the old rule). To these apparently should
be added New Mexico. (See unreported case referred to ii note 11 supra).
62The states listed in notes 48, 49, 51, 52, 56 and 57 supra. (Four states
are apparently called doubtful in 52 A. L. R. 477 478-Arizona, Pennsylvama, Rhode Island and Washington).
63New Hampshire (old case, see note 10 supra) and New Mexico
(old case, see note 11 supra) in addition to the states listed in notes 53-55
supra. (In 52 A. L. R. 477 478 all these states are listed as against the
federal rule)
But New Mexico does not belong in this group if the
decision in the unreported case (see note 11 supra) is followed on the
pending rehearing.
64(1926) 242 N. Y 13, 150 N. E. 585.
65(1903) 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636, affirmed as Adams v. New
York, (1904) 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575.
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law rule. For a time the federal rule was followed by a number of
lower courts in New York.16 But in the Defore Case Judge Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, rejected that rule on grounds
of public policy. He held that the search was unreasonable because the arrest was illegal, and that the search was not justified
because the object found was contraband. He pointed out that
warrants can issue only for contraband, not for evidential matter
and that therefore to dispense with warrants on the ground that
the thing found was contraband is to dispense with them altogether.
Although Judge Cardozo deemed the Adains Case decisive,
he reconsidered the question in the light of the later cases of the
United States Supreme Court. He stated that the Agnello Case
overruled the Adams Case and practically abandoned the procedural condition of a preliminary motion, saying "there has been
no blinking the consequences, the criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered." He noted the difference of opinion
among the states, and stated that thirty-one had rejected the federal rule. He does not list these states and cites only a few cases.
Ohio is among those cited as typically in opposition but, as has
been noted, the Ohio court, while refusing to apply the federal
rule to contraband, intimates that it would be applied to evidential
matter. 8
Judge Cardozo notes that the federal rule "is either too strict
or too lax." He criticizes the doctrine which permits the federal
government to use evidence obtained by the state police or private
individuals, saying, "the professed object of the trespass rather
than the official character of the trespasser should test the rights
of the government." The criticism is just, but the line has been
drawn less finely than Judge Cardozo supposes. It is only where
the seizure is really independent of the federal prosecution that
69
the evidence can be used.
66
People v. Kinney, (1920) 185 N. Y. S. 645 Matter of Horschler.
(1921) 116 Misc. 243, 190 N. Y. S. 355 People v. Jakira. (19-) 118
Misc. 303, 193 N. Y. S. 306.
67(1925) 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145.
68
See note 50 supra. Judge Cardozo also errs by listing among the
authorities supporting the older doctrine my own article. The page cited
(386) contains an approval of Wigniore's criticism of the identification
between the fourth and fifth amendments and not of the federal doctrine as
to the fourth amendment alone, which is distinctly approved at pages
372 and
385.
69
See 34 .Harv. L. Rev. 377 notes 100, 101 and infra notes 83, 84.
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Judge Cardozo argues that since the privilege against unreasonable searches is in New York statutory, the legislature, by not
having amended the statute, has acquiesced in the court's interpretation.
Scrutinizing the consequences of the federal rule he finds
them contrary to the public good.
"The pettiest peace officer would have it in his power through
overzeal or indiscretion to confer immunity upon an offender for
crimes the most flagitious."
The shadow of a murderer let go because of the federal rule
haunts Judge Cardozo as it has haunted others. To meet the argument that without the federal rule the protection against unreasonable searches becomes illusory, Judge Cardozo refers to the civil
actions of the time of Wilkes. He does not, however, refer to
similar verdicts in modern times and it is doubtful if substantial
ones can be found. He concludes that more than the refusal of
juries to bring in verdicts would be necessary to change the law
of evidence. As to the social policy, he says
"There are dangers in any choice. The rule of the Adams
Case strikes a balance between opposing interests. We must hold
it to be the law until those organs of government by which a
change of public policy is normally effected, shall give notice to
the courts that the change has come to pass."
The privilege against self-incrimination is considered and the
Adams Case also held decisive. Judge Cardozo holds that since a
warrant could have issued to seize the thing used in evidence without violation of the privilege, use of the evidence without a warrant cannot violate it. The confusion of the two privileges by
the Supreme Court is criticized. Reservation, however is made
as to the application of the privilege against self-incrimination to
things lawfully possessed. It may be, therefore, that the court
of appeals has left this door open to a substantial application of
the federal rule in a case not involving contraband.
Some of the other cases reach the same conclusion on similar
grounds. The California case of People v. Mayen10 has been often
cited with approval. Distinction is made in that case between
seizure of evidence which violates the constitution and its subsequent use which does not. One case speaks of the federal rule
as a "bomb proof dugout for criminals.""" In Connecticut the
7o(1922) 188 Cal. 237 205 Pac. 435.
7'Massantonio v. People, (1925) 77 Col. 392, 236 Pac. 1019.
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court rejects the federal rule as based on fallacious reasoning and
as "reaching a result which we conceive to be against the peace and
welfare of the community 172 In Iowa earlier decisions barring the
use of evidence were overruled on the ground that the weight of
authority and public policy were against the federal rule." There
was strong dissent on the ground that where a preliminary motion
was made the federal rule was well established. In Kansas it was
admitted that punishment of the offending officer was not effective,
but held that the legislature, not the courts, should give relief."
In this case there was also a strong dissent. In Louisiana the
court refused to follow the federal rule, partly because some
years previously the Constitutional Convention had rejected a
provision barring evidence illegally obtained.7"
It must be admitted that it is not at all clear that the federal
doctrine has actually restricted illegal searches. The mass of
litigation on the subject would indicate the contrary There seems
to be an unfortunate tendency on the part of police and prosecutors alike to take a chance. It is also true that innocent persons
are seldom the victims of illegal searches. In this respect the
fourth amendment is of much less importance than the fifth
amendment. The basis of the privilege against self-incrimination
is that innocent persons might, through nervousness or fear, condemn themselves. 6 This has, in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, been
deemed of sufficient importance to warrant serious restriction on
the prosecuting arm. No similar reason exists with respect to the
fourth amendment. Nevertheless that amendment prescribes a
course of conduct for government for the benefit of the citizen so
that he can pursue his life without fear of the unreasonable invasion of his privacy It is well established that no search warrant can be secured solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence. 7
The old rule would permit the government to do wrongfully that
which it could not lawfully do.", Respect for the law is itself an
72
State
73

v. Reynolds, (1924) 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636.
See note 34 supra.
74
State v. Johnson, (1924) 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245.
75
State v. Eddins, (1926) 161 La. 240, 108 So. 468. See lournal oi
Constitutional Convention, (1921) pp. 423, 455, 471, 1011.
76See 4 Wigniore, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2251, pp. 819-28 6 Jones,
Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2474, p. 4899.
77Gouled v. United States, (1921)
255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261,
65 L. Ed. 647
People v. Chiagles, (1923) 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583. See also
34 Harv. L. Rev. 379 note 116.
78
See State v. Wills, (1922) 91 \V Va. 659, 114 S.F..
261.
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end of government, more important than specific convictions.
Such respect is destroyed if the old rule is adhered to. The
questions of public policy involved are fully treated in a recent
article by Prof. Atkinson."
Those cases which cling to the old rule on the ground that
no collateral inquiry will be permitted are clearly on untenable
ground. As has often been pointed out, collateral inquiry is always
80
permitted when a confession is attacked as improperly obtained.
So the qualifications of an expert, the knowledge of a child witness or the competency of an idiot witness,-these and many other
matters are subjects of collateral inquiry at a trial, which result
often in preliminary cross-examination and decision by the court
in effect a trial in miniature."s None of the cases resting on this
rule have attempted to analyze it, they seem content to refer to
its antiquity 812 The Supreme Court has, however, decided that
where the facts of illegality are undisputed and the defendant had
no reason to know that there had been a seizure, a motion before
trial is not necessary 83
The proponents of the new rule are not always free from
confusion. They sometimes refer to the constitutional prohibition,
sometimes to the impropriety of courts and prosecutors aiding and
abetting wrongdoers. It must be admitted that the text of the
constitution alone does not support the rule-the fourth amendment, as has often been said, is not a rule of evidence. Moreover,
as Judge Cardozo points out, the second ground for the rule goes
much further than the rule itself and should extend the prohibition
to all illegally obtained evidence.
It is suggested there is a formula explaining these apparent
inconsistencies which seems to have been recently adopted by the
Supreme Court. The purpose of the fourth amendment (and its
7925 Col. L. Rev. 11. See also Connor Hall, 8 A. B. A. J. 646 5 Jones,

Evidence, 2d ed., 3865 et seq. See also 36 Yale L. J. 988.
80
State v. Wills, (1922) 91 W Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261, 5 Jones, Evidence, 2d ed., 3878.
81
1t is interesting to note that the New York district attorney in
opposing the federal rule in the Defore Case (see note 41) recognized
basis of the old rule against collateral inquiry
the unsound
82
But see Segurola v. United States, (1927) 275 U. S. 106, 48 Sup. Ct.
end of the
77 (The objection to the evidence was not made until theinquiry
being
trial and was held too late, the rule against collateral
reaffirmed).
83Gouled v. United States, (1921) 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261.
20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4.
65 L. Ed. 647, Agnello v. United States, (1925) 269 U. S. 93
6 MiNNESOTA
70 L. Ed. 145. See I Dakota L. Rev. 3 20 Mich. L. Rev.
LAW REvIEW 245 11 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEw 179.
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analogues in state constitutions) was to protect against the use of
governmental compulsion. Therefore, every seizure made by persons purporting to be government agents or under color of governmental power is within its condemnation. In our peculiar dual
system a seizure by state officers, if they are acting with a view
to federal proceedings, should be within the prohibition, and this
was the decision in Byars v. United States8 ' and Garnbino v
United States."5 In the first of these cases the evidence was obtained by state officers in the presence of a federal officer, in the
second by state officers alone. But in each case there was no state
offense under consideration, only a federal one. The metaphysics
of the case of a state officer making an unlawful search in aid
of a state prosecution, finding evidence of a federal crime and turning it over to federal authorities, is of peculiar subtlety Presuimably, it can be said of such case that the original search, having
been in aid of the state government, was not a violation of the
restrictions on the federal government. State officers may as to
the United States, be deemed private persons, and use of evidence seized by the latter is not prohibited."8
This formula justifies the distinction between officers and
ordinary citizens. Search by the former involves government
compulsion, by the latter it does not. But it would seem that
where a private citizen impersonates an officer he should be treated as such. The theory of this distinction undoubtedly is the
greater freedom possessed by the ordinary person in protecting
himself against trespasses by other private citizens. Clearly he is
not free to use similar methods in repulsing a public officer If,
as seems likely, the fourth amendment was enacted because of this
difference in freedom, it should be interpreted so as completely
to effectuate it. This the federal rule substantially does.
It may be the federal rule goes further indeed. In Gouled v.
Unsted States17 it was held that seizure by stealth is within the
84(1927) 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520.

85(1927) 275 U. S. 310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137 See 28 Col. L. Rev. 511
37 Yale
L. J. 784.
86
Burdeau v. McDowell, (1921) 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65
L. Ed. 1048. (Seizure was made by private detectives sometime before
the prosecution was contemplated. Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented
on the ground that the owner of stolen property was entitled to have
it returned).
See criticism 6 MINNESOTA LAW REvlEw 70.
87(1921) 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (It did not
appear in tus case whether the officer obtained access by virtue of his
governmental position. The court, however, condemned a taking by stealth
whether in the presence or absence of the owner).
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prohibition. If the person making the seizure gains access to the
premises under claim of governmental power, then this seems
sound. If access as well is obtained by stealth the case is not
within the first reason for the rule. It is, however, within the
second reason stated above, namely that the government should not
use improper methods, that it is shocking to the public conscience
to condone an illegal search by using the evidence. This position
abandons the conception of governmental compulsion inherent in
the fourth amendment. It would extend the prohibition to all cases,
whether of fraud or force, where the object of the search, whether
by private persons, state or federal officers, was in relation to the
crime under prosecution. It would permit the use of evidence,
although illegally obtained, if the circumstances of the taking had
no relation to the particular prosecution. Probably this is a better
justification than the one above noted for the distinction between
seizures by state officers and federal officers.
Such formulation of the rule, however raises another question. Suppose the search to be the result of a breach of the
criminal law but not a violation of the fourth amendment. Some
of the authorities and decisions seem to recognize a difference
between an illegality based on constitutional prohibitions and an
illegality due to mere statutory restrictions.""
The question was recently in the minds of some members of
the Supreme Court in Casey v United States."" A conviction was
attacked upon the ground that it had been instigated by federal
detectives. The majority held there was no such instigation,
without discussing what result would follow had there been one.
Justice Brandeis dissented on the ground that without the instigation there would have been no crime and that there should be
no punishment as this would be ratification by the government
of its officers unjustifiable conduct. Justice Butler concurred in
this dissent.
The question as to illegally obtained evidence was directly
involved in Olmstead v. United States.90 Evidence was obtained
by federal agents by tapping telephone wires, which was a misdemeanor in the state where the acts were committed. Two ques885 Jones, Evidence, 2d ed., sec. 2075 note 3. Hughes v. State, (1921)
145 Tenn. 544, 566, 238 S. W 588. State v. Wills, (1922) 91 W Va.
659, 677 114 S. E. 261. People v Castree, (1924) 311 Il. 392, 396, 143
N. E. 112.
89(1928) 276 ,U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 373.
90(1928) 48 Sup. Ct. 564. (Rehearing denied October 8, 1928).

LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE

tions were before the court-was the tapping a violation of the
fourth amendment and did the illegality under the state statute
bar the evidence. Both questions were decided by Mr. Justice
Taft for the majority in the negative. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a
long opinion, dissented on both points. Mr. Justice Holmes was
not prepared to dissent on the first point but did on the second.
Mr. Justice Butler passed only on the first point and vigorously
dissented from the majority Mr. Justice Stone agreed with the
other dissenters.
Let us assume for the moment that the majority was unquestionably sound on its first point, so as better to understand the
ramifications of the second. Justice Taft starts out with the
premise that a common law illegality of taking does not affect the
admissibility of evidence and cites a precise distinction by Jones
to the effect that unless the illegality arises out of a constitutional
prohibition, it will not bar the evidence.
There can be no doubt that at common law illegality did not
bar evidence. It may be doubted, however, whether the distinction
between constitutional and statutory illegalities is well taken. It
must not be forgotten that, resting on the common law the Supreme Court of the United States as late as 1904 refused to bar
evidence obtained by unlawful search upon the ground that the
issues could not be collaterally raised.f 1 That was indeed the
real reason for the old common law rule. It is a reason not possible to justify and has indeed been ignored in many cases." But
it was explicitly recognized as such by the courts and has been
circumvented by the practice of motion before trial. In other
words, the reason for the existence of the common law rule has
disappeared with the newer practice. Nevertheless Justice Taft
merely says that the Weeks Case created an exception based on
constitutional grounds and that the states which follow a similar
rule have declared likewise.
In discussing the state statute, Justice Taft confines himself
to the observation that the statute did not declare that evidence obtained by interception should be inadmissible and that a state
statute could not affect the laws of evidence in United States
courts.
O'Adams v. New York, (1904)

L. Ed. 575.

192 U. S. 585. 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48

92See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 368 notes 42, 43.
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Justice Brandeis emphasizes the fact that the criminal interception was in effect a governmental act and was the basis of the
whole case of the government and therefore use by the government of the evidence amounted to lawbreaking. He argues that
courts will not assist one who comes into court with unclean hands
and that this doctrine should be applicable to criminal cases in
order that respect for law and the administration of justice should
be maintained. It is a noble plea, unfortunately, without precedent to support it.

Justice Holmes puts the matter on more precise footing by
appealing directly to general policy and concluding it is more
important that the government obey the law than that a few
criminals escape. He also recognizes that the Weeks Case showed
the way to a method for testing such questions which is the only
reason given for the common law restriction. Finally, he states
that all the reasons which lead to tie exclusion of evidence obtained by constitutional illegalities apply equally where the illegality
arises only from a statute. It is a pity that these points of view
were not more fully developed for they seem more substantial than
those set forth by Justice Brandeis. As already stated, Justice
Butler did not pass on this point and Justice Stone wrote no
opinion.
The thought suggests itself, what if the statute violated had
been enacted by Congress? There is nothing in the majority
opinion to justify the expectation of a different result and yet a
statement by Justice Holmes somewhat indicates that a distinction
existed in the ninds of some of the judges. It may be that some
of the silent judges composing the majority might join the minority
in reaching a different result if a United States statute had been
violated, and it will be interesting to watch such a case should it
arise.
The difference of opinion in the Olmstead Case may be likened
to the conflict of authority among the various states. In both
problems the fundamental reasons are the same. It is surprising
to find the United States Supreme Court, which has really developed the new rule as to violations of the constitution, side with its
opponents when facing violations merely statutory It may be that
the Supreme Court is preparing to modify its former views. The
statement of Justice Taft that the Gouled Case carried "the inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to the extreme
limit" may be such indication. It seems to me that both questions
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call for the same answer. If the original seizure was unlawful
and can be attributed to governmental act, use of the evidence
should be prohibited.
In the end, it comes to a question of general policy Is it better that a few offenders go free and respect for the law be maintained, or is it better that society be protected against the mistakes
of overzealous officers and they be punished independently? The
answer depends on the point of view There is no doubt that in
many cases the evidence might have been seized tinder a search
warrant, wherefore the courts are reluctant to deprive the state
of what might, with a little care, have become available. It is
also an open question whether unlawful searches will be more
readily restrained by barring the evidence or by independent proceedings against the offenders. Neither curb seems to have been
successful In the recent past. The federal rule is undoubtedly
also in the spirit of the privilege against self-incrimination, if not
within its logic. Modern ideas tend to discredit that prvilege and
perhaps call for an entire reconsideration of our bill of rights,
including such doubtful benefits as due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment. But that leads us to a wider field than can
here be discussed.
(b)

RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OX WHAT
ARE ILLEGAL SEIZURES

At the time my previous article was in the press the Goided
Case was before the Supreme Court. Certain questions had been
certified"3 which presented three important subjects for the first
time to the Supreme Court was a taking by trickerv within the
condemnation of the fourth amendment, was a search warrant
for evidence only a violation of the fourth amendment can property seized for one crime be used on a trial for another I
On the question of trickery the Supreme Court in the
Gouled Case decided in favor of the defendant on the ground
that trickery was the equivalent of force, much as fraud is often
held to be the equivalent of force. This decision was characterized
by Judge Taft in the Olmstead Case as carrying the inhibition "to
the extreme limit."
Both the other questions in the Goided Case were also decided
93(1921) 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647
See 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 386, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 694.
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in favor of defendant. The Supreme Court made a memorable
statement of the purposes for which search warrants may be used
"
they may not be used as a means of gaining access to a
man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal
or penal proceeding, but they may be resorted to only when a
primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the
interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a
valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the
property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be
taken."
Since then the Supreme Court has decided that consent is
not to be inferred from mere passivity, 4 that seizure without warrant after arrest in a dwelling distant from the arrest is unjustified, 05 but that trespass does not prevent the use of knowledge
obtained by eyesight.O0 That general warrants are void and that
the things to be seized must be particularly described has been
reaffirmed.Y1 There must also be more than suspicion in the affidavit on which the warrant was based.98 What constitutes a
sufficient statement of probable cause has been recently under review;90 and this is a question to be determined by the court, not
the jury'0 Where the seizure was lawful other unlawful acts
do not render the evidence inadmissible.'
The protection of the fourth amendment does not extend to
open fields,' 0 nor to a bankrupt's books when in the hands of
the trustee.'
94 Amos v. United States, (1921) 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266, 65
L. Ed. 654. See 5 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 465.
9Agnello v. United States, (1925) 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ud.
145. See 35 Yale L. J. 612.
90
Hester v. United States, (1924) 265 U. S. 57 44 Sup. Ct. 445, 68
L. Ed. 898. See also United States v. Lee, (1925) 274 U. S. 559, 47
Sup. Ct. 746, 71 L. Ed. 1202. See 35 Yale L. J. 382; 37 Yale L. J. 270.
97Marron v. United States, (1927) 275 U. S. 192, 48 Sup. Ct. 74. See
34 Harv. L. Rev. 381, note 127 28 Col. L. Rev. 383.
9sByars v. United States, (1927) 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248, 71
L. Ed. 520. See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 381, note 128 382, note 130 6
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99Steele v. United States, No. 1 (1925) 267 U. S. 498, 45 Sup. Ct. 414,
69 L. Ed. 757 and Dumbra v. United States, (1925) 268 U. S. 435. 45 Sup.
Ct. 546, 69 L. Ed. 1032. See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 382, note 134.
1oOSteele v. United States, No. 2, (1925) 267 U. S. 505, 45 Sup. Ct.
417 69
L. Ed. 761.
0
'McGuire v. United States, (1927) 273 U. S. 95, 47 Sup. Ct. 259.
71 L. Ed. 556. See 25 Col. L. Rev. 497
'o2-Hester

L. Ed. 898.

v. United States, (1924)

265 U. S. 57 44 Sup. Ct. 445. 68
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The rights of corporations have been more precisely defined.'11
A reasonable subpoena cannot be attacked, since a corporation
cannot plead immunity from self-incrimination." 5 But the court
did not suppose that Congress in the Federal Trade Act intended
to permit fishing expeditions, since these would violate the fourth
amendment.20 6

All the foregoing decisions were unanimous and they follow
quite normally from earlier decisions of the Supreme Court.
It must not be forgotten that not all searches without warrant are prohibited. 07 Many of the cases heretofore cited from
the various states held the evidence admissible not only because
they rejected the federal rule but also because the search was
deemed lawful. In Carroll v. United States"'s the Supreme Court
held not unreasonable the seizure of an automobile and its search
for liquor without warrant where the officer had reasonable cause
to believe a crime was being committed under the liquor laws.
The decision was based in part on the ground that the tling seized
was contraband, in part because it was in a moving vehicle, and in
part because of the language of the Act of Congress exempting
the seizing officer from personal liability when he had probable
cause. Justices McReynolds and Sutherland dissented on the
ground that the Volstead Act did not justify arrest without warrant unless the officer discovered a person in the act of committing
a crime, that mere belief a crime was being committed justified
neither arrest nor seizure and that, in fact, there was here no
probable cause for such belief.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has refused to follow some of the state courts.0 9 which permit the use of contraband
2OEx parte Fuller, (1923) 262 U. S. 91, 43 Sup. Ct. 496, 67 L rd.
See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 379, note 112.
104See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 374, notes 74-79.
05
Essgee Co. v. United States, (1923) 262 U. S. 151. 43 Sup. Ct. 514,
67 L. Ed. 917.
'OGFederal Trade Com. v. American Tobacco Co., (1923) 264 U. S. 298.
44 Sup. Ct. 336, 68 L. Ed. 696. See 34 Harv. L. R. 383, note 138, 36 Harv.
L. Rev. 340. See also article by M. Handler, 28 Col. L. Rev. 708.
107 See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 370, note 53, 27 Col. L. Rev. 300.
108(1925) 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543. See 23 Mich.
L. Rev. 891 9 MI.NNESOTA LAW REviEw 474 6 Or. L. Rev. 177 32 Yale
L. J. 490. The rule of this case has been made the law of Florida by statute.
1 Fla. Gen. Laws, 1927 ch. 12257
09
State v. Chucola, (1922) 32 Del. 133, 120 Atd. 212. State v.
Pluth, (1923) 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W 789. State v. Krinski. (1905)
78 Vt. 162, 62 At1. 37 See 19 Il. L. Rev. 303 35 Yale L. J. 512.
881.
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evidence unlawfully seized. This question was involved il several recent cases, 110 although not discussed in the opinions.
It will also be remembered that the protection of the fourth
amendment was, a long time ago, extended to letters in the mail."'
Does it also extend to telephone and telegraph messages" It
would seem that the seizure of a telegraph blank with a message
written on it from the possession of the accused is a clear violation on familiar grounds. \ seizure from the other party, not a
defendant, or from the telegraph company, seems also not a violation as to defendant, upon the familiar principle that only the
owner or person in whose possession the property was may object.1 12 But there has been no decision on this subject by the Supreme Court of the United States. 113 In regard to a memorandum
of a telephone message the same considerations as these would
apply
But suppose that no tangible paper has been seized and the
message-whether telephonic or telegraphic-has been intercepted by wire tapping. This, in the case of a telephone message.
has been held by the Supreme Court in the Olnstead Case " not
a violation of the fourth amendment.
Justice Taft, for the majority, bases this partly on the very
narrow ground that the fourth amendment contemplated only material things, the language of the amendment being "person, house,
papers, effects." A double distinction is made as to letters they
are tangible and under the peculiar protection of the government
because of its monopoly He points out, however, that governmental compulsion which is the principle of the amendment and
the basis of the various decisions, was absent in the case at bar
Justice Brandeis pleads for an extension of the language of
the fourth amendment to cover its purpose as protection of privacy
He points to numerous instances in which the constitution has
been extended to matters which could not have been contemplated
by the framers but which are within the spirit of the pertinent
110Amos v. United States, (1921) 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266, 65

L. Ed. 645, Agnello v. United States, (1925) 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct.
4, 70 L. Ed. 145, and Gambino v. United States, (1927) 275 U. S. 310.
48 Sup. Ct. 137
lilEx parte Jackson, (1877) 96 U. S. 727, 24 L. Ed. 877
1'2 See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 375, notes 82, 84, 85.
11See Carroll v United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280,
69 L. Ed. 543 reserving this point and dictum in Agnello v. United States,
(1925) 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145.
114(1928) 48 Sup. Ct. 564. (Rehearing denied October 8, 1928) See
41 Harv. L. Rev. 258.
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constitutional provision. He pictures further possible extensions
by means of scientific discoveries of invasion against privacy which
should be within the protection of the fourth amendment. The
Boyd Case is quoted for its explicit emphasis on the true meaning
of the fourth amendment, not force exerted on material things
but the invasion of personal security and privacy
He also quotes in a foot note from the brief of counsel for
the telephone companies who, as amicus curiae, argued for the
application of the constitutional guaranties on the ground that by
no other method could citizens be safeguarded from unjustifiable
interference in their private lives.
Justice Holmes, in passing, states some doubt on the subject
but characteristically expresses sympathy with the point of view
which seeks the spirit even if disregarding the letter
Justice Butler makes the point rather strangely overlooked
by both justices Taft and Brandeis that wire tapping involves a
physical interference which can very aptly be described as a search,
if perhaps not so aptly as a seizure. He also relies on the Boyd
Case.
In Boyd v. Umted States11 there was neither search nor
seizure of any kind. Defendant produced papers at the request
of the government, not in obedience to any subpoena carrying
punitive force, but merely to avoid the effect of a presumption
otherwise applicable against him. Nevertheless the court held
that there had been an illegal seizure.
It must be realized, however, that in the Boyd Case and all
the other cases since decided by the Supreme Court there was
some form of direct compulsion by the government on defendant
or his property In the Oblnstead Case there was no compulsion
whatever, no act which acquired sanction because of governmental
authority. The acts of the agents were secret and unknown to
defendant. The decision of the majority therefore, seems sound
so far as the fourth amendment is concerned, although unfor-

tunate, if within existing precedent, on the broader question of
illegally obtained evidence.
(c) As To SELF-INCRIMINATION
There has been much difficulty with the inter-relation between the fourth and fifth amendments.""
The application
"15(1886)
116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746.
116See 34 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 367 notes 31-35.
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of the fifth to all cases where the fourth also applies seems to
have been taken for granted by the Supreme Court in the Gouled
Case117 despite contrary intimations in Adams v. Nev York'"
and the vigorous criticism of this doctrine by Wigmore. 1"" While
on logical principles Wigmore is undoubtedly correct, historical
considerations are probably responsible for the decision of the
Supreme Court. It must be remembered that in the Boyd Case""
what was really self-incrimination was held also to be an unlawful
search, so that it is not surprising to find the use of evidence obtained by unlawful searches also held tantamount to self-incrimination. The matter seems to have received no further attention from the Supreme Court. The conclusions of the Goulcd
Case were simply followed in Agnello v United States."'2 in the
Olmstead Case 22 the court appreciated the dependence of the one
on the other by concluding that the fifth amendment had no application unless the fourth was first violated.
As we have noted, Judge Cardozo in People v Defore"'2 discusses the confusion between the two amendments. He leans
toward the conclusion of Wigmore and various courts in making
the test of self-incrimination "testimonial compulsion" which would
exclude searches and seizures from its scope. But he reserves the
question whether perhaps the unlawful seizure of evidential matter which could not have been seized under a search warrant
might violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
In Commonwealth v Dabbierws24 the supreme court of
Pennsylvania in its first consideration of the subject of illegal
searches considers it solely from the point of view of self-incrinnation. The court considers merely the language of the constitution and concludes that the ordinary meaning of that language does
not support the claim of the defendant.
It will be interesting to see how such states as New York and
Pennsylvania will treat a case in which purely evidential matter
is unlawfully seized and objection is taken under the privilege
against self-incrimination.
117(1921) 255
L. Rev. 394.
118(1904) 192
1194 Wigmore
120(1886) 116
121(1925) 269

U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 467

See 20 Mich.

U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575.
Evidence, 1st ed. 3122-3127 see also 31 Yale L. J. 518.
U. S. 616, Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746.
U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145.

122(1928) 48 Sup. Ct. 564.

123(1926) 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585.
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